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Abstract
Human-Automation Design main target is to design sys-
tems in such a way that the couple system operator per-
forms as efficiently as possible. Means for such designs in-
clude identifying functions (on the system side) and tasks
(on the operator’s side) and balancing the allocation of
tasks and functions between operators and the systems
being operated. Allocating functions to the most suitable ac-
tor has been the early driver of function allocation [18]. The
philosophy of recommender systems is that the system will
provide a set of options for the users to select from. Such
behavior can be easily connected to previous work on lev-
els of automation as defined by Sheridan [34] and lessons
can be drawn from putting together these two views. When
these automations (including the one of recommender sys-
tems) are not adequately designed (or correctly understood
by the operator), they may result in so called automation
surprises [25, 32] that degrade, instead of enhance, the
overall performance of the operations. This position paper
identifies issues related to bringing recommender systems
in the domain of safety critical interactive systems. While
their advantages are clearly pointed out by their advocates,
limitations are usually hidden or overlooked. We present
this argumentation in the case of the ECAM (Electronic
Centralised Aircraft Monitor) of which some behavior could
be considered as similar to the one of a recommender sys-
tem. We also highlight some engineering aspects of deploy-
ing recommender systems in the safety critical domain.
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Introduction
Human-Automation Design main target is to design sys-
tems in such a way that the couple system operator per-
forms as efficiently as possible. Allocating functions to the
most suitable actor has been the early driver of function al-
location as advocated by Fitts [18]. Such work is known as
MABA-MABA (Men Are Better At âA˘S¸ Machine Are Bet-
ter At) where the underlying philosophy is that automate
as many functions as possible was perceived as adequate
(see for instance [11]). This technology-centered view has
led to unsafe and unusable systems [32] and it became
clear that the design of usable partly-autonomous systems
is a difficult task.
Recommender systems belong to this trend of work on au-
tomation, even though that characteristic is not put forward
or even ignored by their designers and promoters. When
the word automation is connected to recommender systems
it is usually for explaining that the recommender system is
evolving autonomously as in “automated collaborative filter-
ing” used for instance in GroupLens [21].
When automation is not adequately designed, or correctly
perceived and then understood by the operator, they may
result in so called automation surprises [33] that degrade,
instead of enhance as expected, the overall performance
of the operations and might lead to incidents or even ac-
cidents [25]. The issue of usability of recommenders sys-
tems has also been identified in the early days [35] even
though only perceived as an interactive application being
used by users and not an interaction taking place with a
partly-autonomous system. Work in that domain focuses
on usefulness of the recommender systems and on their
usability or user experience [20].
This paper argues that having an automation-centered view
on recommender systems helps to identify design issues
related to their user interfaces and could inform design de-
cisions and evaluation of these systems. Such a perspec-
tive could also help understanding issues that have to be
addressed prior to the deployment of such systems in the
context of safety critical interactive systems.
The next section proposes a short overview of the main
concepts related to automations and focuses on the human
aspects of automation. Then the paper positions recom-
mender systems within that context and highlights similari-
ties with other systems as well as their specificities. The pa-
per then presents the case study of the ECAM (Electronic
Centralised Aircraft Monitor) and how this system relates to
recommender systems. Last section lists design and engi-
neering issues related to the deployment of recommender
systems in the area of safety critical interactive systems.
Even though those levels can support the understanding
of automation they cannot be used as a mean for assess-
ing the automation of a system which has to be done at a
much finer grain i.e., “function” by “function”. However, if a
detailed description of the “functions” is provided they make
it possible to support both the decision and the design pro-
cess of migrating a function from the operator’s activity to
the system or vice versa.
HIGH 10. The computer decides every-
thing, acts autonomously, ignoring
the human
9. Informs the human only if it, the
computer, decides to
8. Informs the human only if
asked, or
7. Executes automatically, then
necessarily informs the human,
and
6. Allows the human a restricted
time to veto before automatic
execution, or
5. Executes that suggestion if the
human approves, or
4. Suggests one alternative
3. Narrows the selection down to a
few, or
2. The computer offers a complete
set of decision/action alternatives,
or
LOW 1. The computer offers no as-
sistance: human must take all
decisions and actions
Figure 1: Levels of automation of decision and action selection
from [34] and [27]
As stated in [27], automated systems can operate at spe-
cific levels within this continuum and automation can be
applied not only to the output functions but also to input
functions. Figure 2 presents the four-stage model of human
information processing as introduced in [27].
Figure 2: Simple four-stages model of human information
processing.
The first stage refers to the acquisition and recording of
multiple forms of information. The second one involves con-
scious perception, and manipulation of processed and re-
trieved information in working memory. The third stage is
where decisions are accomplished by cognitive processes.
The last one contains the implementation of a response or
action consistent with decision made in the previous stage.
The first three stages in that model represent how the op-
erator processes the information that is rendered by the
interactive system. The last stage identifies the response
from the user that may correspond to providing input to the
controlled system by means of the interactive system (flow
of events from the user towards the controlled system.
Figure 3: Four classes of system functions (that can be
automated)
The model in Figure 2 (about human information process-
ing) has a similar counterpart in system’s functions as shown
in Figure 3. Each of these functions can be automated
to different degrees. For instance, the sensory process-
ing stage (in Figure 2) could be migrated to the informa-
tion acquisition stage (in Figure 3) by developing hardware
sensors. The second stage in the human model could be
automated by developing inferential algorithms (as for in-
stance in recommender systems). The third stage involves
selection from several alternatives which can be easily im-
plemented with algorithms. The final stage called action
implementation refers to the execution of the choice. Au-
tomation of this stage may involve different levels of ma-
chine execution and could even replace physical effectors
(e.g., hand or voice) of the operator [28]. The stages of hu-
man information processing as well as their corresponding
classes of system functions are used to analyze and de-
sign which tasks are performed by the human operator and
which functions are performed by the system (also called
function allocation as defined in [15]).
Based on this theoretical framework, several techniques
and methods have been proposed to analyze, design and
evaluate human automation interaction. Proud et al. pro-
posed the LOA (Level Of Autonomy) Assessment Tool [30]
(based on a LOA Assessment Scale) which produces an-
alytical summaries of the appropriate LOA for particular
functions and has been applied to an Autonomous Flight
Management System. Cummings et al. [13] identified a re-
finement mechanism for the decision making step, to help
in deciding which one of the human or of the system should
perform a given decision task. More generally, techniques
based on cognitive task analysis, such as the one proposed
in [3], help in understanding precisely the different tasks
that are actually performed by the human operator. Model
based approaches take advantage of task analysis and
propose to systematically ensure consistency and coher-
ence between task models and system behavioral descrip-
tion [22]. Johansson et al. [19] developed a simulation tool
to analyze the effect of the level of automation and empha-
size the importance of a simulation framework to have a
feedback on design choices before deploying the system.
Finally, several techniques have been coined to provide
support for formal verification of human automation inter-
action [9], which aim at providing tools for checking confor-
mance between what the system has to perform, and what
the user is responsible for. For each of these techniques
and methods, human automation interaction is dealt with as
a whole and thus focusing on goal-related tasks.
Recommender systems as
partly-autonomous system
Recommender systems may be based on different ap-
proaches. They may implement content-based filtering,
knowledge-based filtering, collaborative filtering or hybrid
filtering [8]. We don’t describe here the various types of
recommender systems in details and encourage the inter-
ested reader to see [8] for a very detailed and pedagogic
survey. We here focus on content-based approaches for
recommender systems as it is a relevant filtering approach
for interactive cockpits. Figure 4 presents a typical architec-
ture of a content-based recommender system. The system
stores a set of items and each item is described accord-
ing to a set of attributes. In such systems the user is de-
scribed according to these attributes too, this description
being named user profile. According to the user profile and
the attributes of the set of items, the systems proposes to
the user a set of recommendations.
Recommender Systems and Levels of Automation:
According to the levels of automation presented in Fig-
ure 1 recommender systems typically fall within levels 2
to 4 depending on the number of alternatives presented to
the user. Rules for designing autonomous systems would
thus apply to recommender systems to avoid know issues
Figure 4: Content-based recommendation principle (from [8])
such as automation surprises [32] and [25]. Issue of trans-
parency of automation has been also identified for recom-
mender systems [14] while a process and a notation to sys-
tematically engineer transparency for partly-autonomous
systems was proposed in [7].
Recommender Systems and systems functions: The
recommender system behavior in Figure 4 and the classes
of system functions in Figure 3 can be related as follows:
• Information acquisition: this stage corresponds to
the process in the recommender systems browsing
the internal source of items being candidates for rec-
ommendation. Information can be entirely stored at
initialization or gathered during execution.
• Information analysis: this stage corresponds to the
recommender system process of correlating user
profile with items description.
• Decision and action selection: this stage corre-
sponds to the filtering process of the recommender
system selecting amongst the list of candidate items
and ranking them before presentation to the operator.
• Action implementation: this stage corresponds to
the presentation on the user interface of the selected
items to the operator. That presentation of informa-
tion can be sometimes enriched with argumentation
about the rationale for selecting items [12]. It is also
important to note that, following that presentation of
information, user interaction is usually available allow-
ing users to browse the list of recommended items,
to access more information about them and to select
the desired one. Such operator behavior is taken ex-
plicitly into account by the operator behavior model of
Figure 2 and detailed below.
Recommender Systems and operators behavior: As
far as user activity is concerned the operator behavior de-
scribed in Figure 2 can be refined for describing interaction
with a recommender system.
According to the four stages of human information process-
ing proposed in Figure 2 it is easy to relate to the recom-
mender system behavior:
• Sensory processing: while interacting with the rec-
ommender system this activity would consist in all
operators’ information sensing both from the recom-
mender and from the system under use. Localiza-
tion of the information from the recommender system
might deeply impact that sensing.
• Perception/working memory: at this stage informa-
tion from the recommender system will be integrated
with the information presented by the system. It is
important to note that human errors such as interfer-
ence, overshooting a stop rule... [31] and thus should
be avoided (and is not possible detected, recovered
or mitigated).
• Decision making: this corresponds to the decision
of the operator for selecting one of the recommenda-
tions presented by the recommender system (if more
than one is offered).
• Response selection: this is the actual selection of
one of the recommender system recommendation.
As stated above, that stage might involve additional
cycles within this 4 stages model (while operators
interact with the recommender systems e.g. browsing
the recommendation or accessing more information
about a given recommendation).
The mapping between recommender system processes
and Parasuraman’s system functions as well as the map-
ping between activities done with recommender systems
and Parasuraman’s stages of human information process-
ing, provides support to analyze the impact of the level of
automation of the recommender system functions on the
operators’ task.
Illustrative example
To exemplify the concept presented above in the context
of a safety critical system, we present a case study from
the avionics domain: the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Air-
craft Monitor) in the Airbus family. The ECAM is a system
that monitors aircraft systems (e.g., the engines) and re-
lays to the pilots data about their state (e.g., if their use is
limited due to a failure) and the procedures that have to be
achieved by the pilots to recover from the failure.
The ECAM system is composed of several systems. More
particularly, the Flight Warning System (FWS) is in charge
of the processing of data from the monitoring of the aircraft
systems. This processing enables: i) the display of infor-
mation about the status of the aircraft systems parameters
(using the System Display (SD)); ii) the display of warnings
about system failures and procedures that have to be com-
pleted by the pilot to process the detected warning (using
the Warning Display (WD)) and iii) the production of aural
and visual alerts (using several lights and loudspeakers in
the cockpit).
The SD and WD are displayed, in the cockpit of the A380,
on two separated Display Units (DU). These two DUs are
highlighted in Figure 5 and are part of the eight of DUs
composing the Control and Display System (CDS). The
CDS is the interactive system in aircraft cockpits (flight
decks) that offers various operational services of major im-
portance for flight crew. It displays aircraft parameters, and
enables the flying crew to graphically interact with these
parameters using a keyboard and a mouse (KCCU for Key-
board and Cursor Control Unit) to control aircraft systems.
Figure 5: WD and SD in the cockpit of the A380
As presented in Figure 6, if the ECAM has created, simulta-
neously, several warning messages, it sorts them, in order
to obtain a display order, according to three inhibition mech-
anisms:
• Their priority: a priority is associated to each warning
message;
• FWS internal behavior: some warning messages
may be inhibited in case of presence of others warn-
ing messages (for instance, the “APU fault” warning
message is not displayed if the “APU fire” is already
detected);
• The current flight phase: some warning messages
are only displayed when the aircraft is in a given flight
phase (for instance, flight management systems fail-
ures are not displayed after landing).
Figure 6: Principle for the display of the warnings
Therefore, the warning messages are displayed (in the pro-
cessed display order) to the pilots, within the WD, with three
different colors, representing their priority level:
• Red warnings that require immediate actions from the
pilots (e.g., the loss of an engine);
• Amber warnings that require non-immediate actions
from the pilots (e.g., a fault within the APU);
• Green warnings that only require monitoring from the
pilots but do not present any danger.
Figure 7 presents an example of the display of warning
messages (one red warning and three amber warnings)
and their associated recovery procedures on the ECAM.
In this example, the red warning (L1 in Figure 7) informs
the pilot that the autopilot is not working anymore. There-
fore, the first amber warning (L2 in Figure 7) informs the
pilot that the auto-thrust is not working anymore. The cor-
responding recovery procedure (L3 in Figure 7) indicates
to the pilot that s/he has to take responsibility for the thrust
by moving the thrust levers. The second amber warning (L4
and L5 in Figure 7) informs the pilot that the flight control
laws are not working anymore. The corresponding recovery
procedures (L6 in Figure 7) indicates to the pilot that s/he
has to take responsibility for the aircraft speed that must be
under 0.82 MACH.
Figure 7: Example of the display of warning messages on the
ECAM (from [10])
These warnings messages notification are similar to rec-
ommendations in recommender systems (see, for instance,
the one presented in Figure 4) in the sense that the sys-
tem sorts the warning messages and their associated re-
covery procedures and proposes, to the pilots, an order
for their treatment. In this example, the system indicates
to the pilot that the auto-thrust management function is off
and indicates to the pilot that s/he shall manually move the
thrust levers (lines 2 and 3 in Figure 4). Using Parasura-
man’s models, we can analyze that the system fall within
level 4 of automation (Figure 1). In other cases, the sys-
tem may propose a list of prioritized alarms and recovery
procedures, which make the system fall within level 3 of au-
tomation (Figure 1). As inferred in the Parasuraman’s level
of automation, the more alternatives the system proposes,
the less automated.
Design and engineering issues of recommender
systems in safety critical domain
This section tries to identify the potential of recommender
systems as well as the design issues related to their engi-
neering.
The classification framework of recommender systems pro-
posed in [29] identifies multiple application domains where
recommender systems have been deployed (as an excerpt
is presented in Figure 8).
Figure 8: Classification framework of recommender systems
(from [29])
It is interesting to note that none of them target at critical
or safety critical domain. [14] presents the evaluation of
a recommender system for single pilot operations but no
information is given about the design and development of
the underlying system and nor about its user interface and
interaction techniques.
We have considered several engineering approaches to
examine these issues. First, the ICO user interface design
techniques enables to develop usable and reliable interac-
tion techniques [24]. Complemented with task modelling
(for describing operators goals and tasks to be performed
to reach these goals), it can be used to analyze user’s task
w.r.t. system’s behavior [22]. At last, task models can also
be used to assess whether the user or the system should
handle a particular task in a particular context [22]. All of
these techniques aim at finding the optimal collaboration
solution between the user and the system but were not ap-
plied with a recommender systems, even with the AMAN
(Arrival Manager) advisory tool for air traffic control which
could be also considered as a simple recommender sys-
tem [23].
However these approaches do not deal with the possible
dynamic change of behavior of the system, especially if it
has machine learning capabilities (reinjecting operators’ se-
lections in the items information). Additionally, considering
that the safety-critical user interfaces require additional de-
sign and development paths, we identified the following set
of issues that must be considered if the system is (partly)
autonomous:
• What is usability of a recommender system in a criti-
cal context and how to evaluate it (as operators follow
extensive training and have deep knowledge of the
behavior of the supervised systems),
• How to guarantee the safety and dependability of the
possible interactions when browsing recommended
items,
• How to guarantee the safety and dependability of the
underlying recommender system behavior,
• How to analyze and prevent operators’ errors,
• How to assess and design responsibility, authority
and liability between the recommender system and
the operators (for instance in aircraft the entire au-
thority belong to the captain and not to the first offi-
cer),
• How to design and specify interaction techniques
where autonomous behavior from the system inter-
fere with operator input (including the question on
how to model that formally [7]),
• How to design interaction so that the operators can
foresee the systems’ future steps and states and the
impact of selecting one recommendation instead of
another one,
• How to design interactions when the automation (rec-
ommendation) can fail and how to notify the operators
about degradation of the recommender system (for
each of the stages in Figure 3),
• How to enhance and evaluate aspects of user experi-
ence, while fulfilling the constraints of a safety-critical
system which has to be secure, safe, reliable and us-
able.
Summary and Conclusion
This position paper proposed to consider recommender
systems as partly-autonomous systems. We have demon-
strated that their behavior is similar to the ones of autonomous
systems and that existing classifications in that domain are
applicable to recommender systems.
We have shown on a simple example from the aviation do-
main that current systems exhibits some of the characteris-
tics of recommender systems. We have also highlighted de-
sign and development issues that currently prevent recom-
mender from being deployed in the context of safety critical
systems but we have also highlighted some of the problems
to be addressed.
Future work deals with the definition of engineering ap-
proaches for building reliable and fault-tolerant recom-
mender systems following what has been done in the past
for interactive cockpit applications as presented in [16]
and [36]. It is important to note that trade-off between prop-
erties (such as usability and dependability as presented
in [17]) will also be present in the case of recommender
systems in safety critical applications.
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